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Causation in Reflective Judgment 
 
Michael Kurak, Windsor, Ontario 
 
Abstract 
 
he existing body of scholarship on Kant’s Critique of 
Judgment is rife with disagreement. At the centre of 
much of this disagreement is the issue of precisely what 
Kant understands to be taking place in a harmonization of the 
cognitive faculties. Is aesthetic reflective judgment to be iden-
tified with, or separated from, this harmonious state of the 
faculties of imagination and understanding? If aesthetic judg-
ment is identified with this state, as is argued herein, then upon 
what is a judgment of beauty to be based? These questions are 
addressed by focussing on two closely related aspects of Kant’s 
theory of reflective judgment; the role Kant assigns to the 
power of desire (i.e., to the will) and to the causal structure 
implicated in reflective judgment. In brief, we argue that a 
judgment of beauty is not, strictly speaking, something that I do, 
but is better described that something that happens of itself. 
 
Introduction 
 
here are two long-standing problems in the literature on 
the Critique of Judgment that I would like to revisit in 
this essay; first, the so-called problem of the key and 
second, the problem of third Critique's internal consistency. 
Both of these problems are intimately bound up with Kant's 
claim that reflective judgment must be governed in accordance 
with an a priori principle. Hence, the essay will focus primarily 
on explicating this demand as it impacts upon these two prob-
lems. 
T 
T 
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13 
The problem of the key arises because Kant grounds 
judgments of beauty in a mental state which he declares to be 
“universally communicable” but which he simultaneously app-
ears to bar from having any phenomenal qualities by means of 
which it could be identified. A judgment of beauty is said to be 
the result of the activation of an underlying cognitive system 
whose only phenomenal product is the feeling of pleasure. But 
Kant is careful to observe that we must not consider a judgment 
of beauty to be based on this feeling. For if a judgment of 
beauty were so based, there would be no way for it to be 
distinguished from a mere liking. However, by declaring 
judgments of beauty to be based on a mental state that is 
“universally communicable” Kant gives us reason to think that 
he is arguing for the existence of some identifiable state of the 
subject upon which judgments of beauty are based; and here we 
might add that if a judgment of beauty were based on any 
phenomenal state of the subject, the judgment would seem to be 
an empirical one (i.e., and so would involve a concept). 
Since Kant declares that the key to the critique of taste lies in 
the solution to this aporia, much ink is spilled over it. Béatrice 
Longuenesse, for instance, argues that “a first order pleasure 
taken in the free play of the faculties [should be] supplemented 
by a second order pleasure taken in the universal communi-
cability of the first order pleasure, without any deliberative act 
of judging being necessary…”1 Hannah Ginsborg argues for 
considering the necessary judgment to be reflexively self-
validating; a proposal which seems to lead only to the idea of a 
“kind of pleasure which is characteristic of taste.”2 Henry 
Allison argues for a slight departure from the text so that Kant 
can be read as intending for a universally communicable mental 
                                                
1 Béatrice Longuenesse, “Kant’s Theory of Judgment, and Judgments of Taste: On Henry 
Allison’s Kant’s Theory of Taste,” Inquiry 46 (2003): 154. For a critique of this proposal see 
Henry Allison, “Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg,” Inquiry 46 (2003): 
186. 
2 Hannah Ginsborg, “Reflective Judgment and Taste," NOÛS 24 (1990): 72. 
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14 
state of the subject to be the distinguishing mark of aesthetic 
pleasure.3 Rachel Zuckert presents us with the idea that the 
universal validity of aesthetic pleasure depends “upon a self-
legislated activity of the subject… [that can] be shared by 
others” and demanded of others as well.4 Finally, Joseph 
Cannon argues similarly for an active judging subject whose 
judgments of taste have “two [simultaneous] valences… one 
directed toward the object in intuition, the other toward one’s 
own mental activity; in reflecting on the object.”5 The fact that 
such a diversity of hypotheses can co-exist seems to imply an 
inadequacy of grounds to decide between them. 
In what follows I will argue primarily for two theses. First, 
the universal communicability of the mental state upon which a 
judgment of beauty is to be based is to be found in a change of 
state, which Kant characterizes as relief from a need. While this 
state is certainly not misidentified as pleasure, it is better charac-
terized negatively, as the temporary absence of the background 
state that regularly accompanies our day-to-day endeavours.6 
Second, Kant goes beyond what he can rightfully declare in this 
matter. Following through the logic of the third Critique leads 
                                                
3 Henry Allison, “Reply to the Comments of Longuenesse and Ginsborg,” Inquiry 46 
(2003): 189-190. 
4 Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology, (Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 335. 
It may be the case that the subject must be anticipatory in making aesthetic judgments, but it 
is not clear that reflective judgment simpliciter is anticipatory in any sense. Kant says, 
“judgment prescribes…to itself” (KU, 5:185-186) or “judgment legislates… solely to itself” 
(FI, 20:225). 
5 Joseph Cannon, “The Intentionality of Judgments of Taste in Kant’s Critique of Judgment,” 
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 66:1 (2008) p. 55. 
6 As Socrates remarks near the beginning of the Phaedo: "How singular is the thing called 
pleasure, and how curiously related to pain, which might be thought to be the opposite of it; 
for they never come to a man together, and yet he who pursues either of them is generally 
compelled to take the other. They are two, and yet they grow together out of one head or 
stem; and I cannot help thinking that if Aesop had noticed them, he would have made a fable 
about God trying to reconcile their strife, and when he could not, he fastened their heads 
together; and this is the reason why when one comes the other follows, as I find in my own 
case pleasure comes following after the pain in my leg, which was caused by the chain." 
Benjamin Jowett, Phaedo, (1901): 60B. 
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15 
to the conclusion that the universal communicability of the 
mental state, upon which a judgment of beauty is to be based, 
can only indicate the fact that I cannot help but judge certain 
objects to be beautiful, but not that they are beautiful. 
In making these arguments I apply Kant’s technic of judg-
ment, as outlined in the latter part of the Critique of Judgment, 
to his analysis of reflective judgment. Reflective judgment, 
which Kant argues depends upon a natural purposiveness (a 
purposiveness without a purpose), qualifies for such an analysis. 
In this case, Kant judges reflective judgment itself to be func-
tioning as a natural purpose. This fact reveals the nature of the 
causal structure that Kant takes to be occurring in a harmon-
ization of the cognitive faculties, which, in turn, provides us 
with an answer to the problem of the key. 
 
Background 
 
n order to provide an epistemological foundation for 
science and, at the same time, to make room for faith, the 
Critique of Pure Reason relies upon the idea that our 
experiences are organized a priori in accordance with certain 
laws of the mind, which Kant divides into pure intuitions and 
pure concepts.7 On this account, pure intuitions of space and 
time accomplish preliminary organization of the raw 
“manifold” of experience after which point this product is 
subject to further organization in accordance with pure 
concepts. Since the act of organizing intuitions under concepts 
is an act of judgment, establishing the possibility of scientific 
knowledge requires providing an account of the ability of the 
mind to judge correctly. 
In the first Critique the crucial task of securing a priori judg-
ment is assigned to intermediates, which Kant calls schemata. 
                                                
7 I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Werner S. Pluhar (Indiana: Hackett, 
1781/1787/1996), KrV A 7-10/B 11-14. All translated quotations from the Critique of Pure 
Reason are from this edition. 
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16 
“Without schemata,” he tells us, “the categories [i.e., the pure 
concepts] are only functions of the understanding for producing 
concepts, but they present no object.”8 Schemata are necessary, 
therefore, to the possibility of experience itself. Their essential 
function is to guide the application of pure concepts to the 
intuited manifold so as to permit the discovery of universal 
truths. Just how schemata perform this function, however, is 
problematic for Kant. In the chapter titled “On the Schematism 
of the Pure Concepts of Understanding” Kant explicates the 
activity of schematizing in terms of rules, or rule-like processes, 
for the subsumption of particulars under universals.9 Unfor-
tunately, the explication of schemata in such terms ultimately 
compromises our ability to understand how they can do the job 
for which they were designed. 
In the section immediately prior to Kant’s discussion of the 
schematism of pure concepts he notes the following problem 
with the general strategy of the first Critique.10 If understanding 
is explicated as our power of rules then the power of judgment 
is the power to subsume under rules, that is, to distinguish 
whether something does or does not fall under a given rule. 
General logic, however, since it abstracts from all content, can 
provide no guidance to this power. For if it sought to give 
general instruction as to how we are to subsume under rules this 
could only be by means of another rule; and since a rule is 
merely a formal principle that cannot provide its own internal 
measure of correctness, the epistemological demand that the 
power of judgment be guided by universal and a priori rules 
leads ultimately to an infinite regress of rules for the power of 
judgment.11 Given that Kant’s recognition of this problem 
occurs just before he introduces schemata, it can seem 
                                                
8 KrV, B 187. 
9 KrV, A 141/B 180. 
10 KrV, A 133/B 172. 
11 KrV, A 133/ B 172. 
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17 
something of a mystery as to why he resorts to describing their 
function in terms of rules for the application of rules. 
The short answer to this mystery is that Kant is caught in a 
trap of his own devising. Kant understands schemata to be 
functions of transcendental logic, which are not subject to the 
limitations of general logic.12 According to Kant, transcendental 
philosophy has the advantage over general logic “that, besides 
indicating the rule (or, rather, the universal condition for rules) 
that is given in the pure concept of the understanding, it can 
simultaneously indicate a priori the case to which the rules are 
to be applied.”13 Be this as it may, when it comes to explaining 
to the reader how schemata are able to perform their assigned 
task of subsuming intuitions under concepts Kant is forced to 
rely analogically upon general logic. Although schemata may 
benefit from transcendental logic, one's understanding of how 
schemata perform their function does not. 
If knowledge is to be possible, the understanding must be 
made epistemologically secure. For Kant, this means that the 
understanding must be guided by a priori rules or principles. 
The attempt to specify necessary and sufficient conditions for 
the application of a rule or principle is, however, a project 
doomed from the first, for such criteria can only be provided in 
terms of further rules, which again require guidance from 
judgment and so on ad infinitum. Hence, Kant is led to con-
clude the passage in which he sets out this problem with the 
suggestion that the power of judgment depends for its security 
on “a particular talent” about which he finds he can say very 
little. The centrality of this problem to Kant’s critical system 
accounts, in large part, for his devotion to writing a Critique of 
Judgment.14  
                                                
12 KrV, A 136/ B 175.  
13 KrV, B 174.  
14 For further defense of this interpretation of the role of the third Critique see, for example, 
David Bell, “The Art of Judgment,” Mind: A Quarterly Review of Philosophy, XCVI (382), 
(1987): 221- 244. 
                                          KSO 2016: 
 
 
Michael Kurak 
Causation in Reflective Judgment 
KSO 2016: 12-41. Posted February 29, 2016 
www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2016 Michael Kurak & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 
 
 
18 
 
The A Priori Principle of Purposiveness 
 
ant begins the Critique of Judgment by expanding 
upon and further complicating the account of judg-
ment provided in the Critique of Pure Reason. He 
observes that whether one is addressing theoretical or practical 
concerns, reason always depends for its material upon the 
application of universals (rules, principles, laws) to particulars; 
that is, upon acts of determinative judgment in which particulars 
are subsumed under universals.15 However, since "the laws that 
pure understanding gives a priori concern only the possibility 
of nature as such,”16 pure concepts alone are insufficient for 
actual experiences of nature, which require the addition of 
empirical concepts.17 The pure concept of causation, for 
example, merely guarantees that the attempt to understand the 
world in terms of causes is not in vain. Precisely what causes 
are at work in nature must be discovered; and this process 
depends upon the lawful formation and application of empirical 
concepts. Hence, to fully secure the possibility of knowledge 
Kant must provide an account of the formation and application 
of both pure and empirical concepts, and he must do so in a 
manner that is not dependent upon an analogy with general 
logic. 
Of course, for Kant, neither pure nor empirical concepts are 
lying about in the understanding waiting to be selected and 
deployed.18 Instead, concepts of both types must form in the 
context in which they are to be applied. Securing this process 
                                                
15 I. Kant, Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. Pluhar. (Indiana: Hackett, 1987), KU, 
5:175-179, 196. All translated quotations from the third Critique are from this edition. 
16 KU, 5:179. 
17 KU, 5:179. 
18 Although Kant does, on occasion, speak about the possession of concepts, he believes that 
relations of time “lie wholly outside the concepts of understanding” (B 159). Hence, for 
Kant, the use of concepts is “based on the spontaneity of thought” (A 68-9/B 93-4, cf. also, A 
79/B 105, A 86/B 118, A 126-8, B 148-9). 
K 
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epistemologically requires, in each case, that the underlying 
system be governed in accordance with an a priori principle; 
for this is the only way that Kant can guarantee that what 
emerges does so necessarily. But an a priori principle has no 
existence independently from the system which it governs, just 
as the universal law of gravitation has no existence indepen-
dently from its instantiation in bodies. Such a principle is rather 
a formal description of the behaviour of a system. 
Now, Kant regards both empirical and pure concepts as laws. 
But, he remarks, "if [empirical concepts] are to be regarded as 
laws (as the concept of nature does require) then they must be 
regarded as necessary by virtue of some principle of the unity of 
the diverse, even though we do not know this principle."19 
Hence, like pure concepts, empirical concepts form a synthetic 
unity (or a system) in which each concept is a universal con-
dition for the existence of all the other concepts, in accordance 
with an a priori principle. But, as Kant argues in the Critique of 
Teleological Judgment, the normativity that governs the devel-
opment of such systems appears also as a product of the 
reciprocal relations that exist among their parts. In other words, 
the systems responsible for the spontaneous production of both 
pure and empirical concepts appear to us as self-organizing 
entities (i.e., as natural purposes). As a result, we are able to 
consider the normativity that governs reflective judgment in the 
on-demand formation of concepts, which Kant captures in a 
priori principles, to be supplied by the reciprocal relations that 
exist between the elements of the total system of concepts. It is 
this organizational structure then which guarantees that con-
cepts form invariably and unfailingly, just as crystals form un-
failing when certain conditions obtain between the elements 
which comprise them. 
The central task of reflective judgment is, once again, the 
formation/application of concepts. This requires the non-
                                                
19 KU, 5:179. 
                                          KSO 2016: 
 
 
Michael Kurak 
Causation in Reflective Judgment 
KSO 2016: 12-41. Posted February 29, 2016 
www.kantstudiesonline.net 
© 2016 Michael Kurak & Kant Studies Online Ltd. 
 
 
20 
arbitrary unification of the diverse elements that comprise the 
manifold; that is, a unification of the matter of the faculty of 
imagination leading to the emergence of concept (a form) that 
we can then judge to be governing that very unification. In 
accordance with the concept of a natural purpose, the requisite 
normativity must be supplied to the faculty of imagination by 
the reciprocal means-ends relations that exist between the very 
elements of which it, at any given moment, is comprised.20 In 
this case, all the diverse “parts” of which the manifold is com-
prised, through their own causality, in some way, produce one 
another as regards both their form and combination, and in this 
way produce a whole whose concept can, conversely, be judged 
to be the cause of the very process of unification, so that the 
connection of efficient causes can at the same time be judged to 
be a causation through final causes. Thus, the required 
normativity is supplied by the system itself. 
Hence, while the system responsible for the spontaneous 
formation and application of pure concepts is entirely contained 
within the understanding, the corresponding system of empiri-
cal concepts is not.21 This fact points to the central difference 
between the systems of pure and empirical concepts. While we 
are able to know that the former system is both complete and 
governed in accordance with an a priori principle (i.e., the 
principle of original synthetic unity of apperception), we must 
only presume this to be the case for the latter system, the 
                                                
20 A centerpiece of Zuckert’s book is her defense of an identity of means-ends relations with 
purposiveness without a purpose. For further support of this claim I defer to her arguments; 
see, in particular, (op. cit., 2007, pp. 123-124, p. 193, pp. 224-230). The central difference 
between the position being advocated here and the one set out by Zuckert can be traced to the 
fact that, for a variety of reasons, Zuckert believes aesthetic reflective judgment to be an 
activity of the subject, i.e., aesthetic reflective judging.  
21 Hence, in the case of pure concepts Kant writes that the “instruction for reflection is 
already [contained] in the concept of a nature as such, i.e., in the understanding, and 
judgment schematizes a priori and applies these schemata to each empirical synthesis, 
without which no empirical judgment whatever would be possible. Here judgment not only 
reflects but also determines, and its transcendental schematism also provides it with a rule 
under which it subsumes given empirical intuitions” (FI, 20:213). 
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individual members of which must all be discovered. If we are 
to make progress in the discovery of the actual members of this 
system, and so to have a basis upon which to differentiate true 
from false members, then the idea that it has a complete and 
final form must be presupposed. Unmoored from both the pure 
understanding and from the raw manifold of intuition, reflective 
judgment governs itself, therefore, in accordance with an a 
priori principle that it "gives as a law, but only to itself."22 In 
this way, "our reflection on the laws of nature is governed by 
[the concept of] nature [i.e., in accordance with the technic of 
judgment]."23 
Relief from Our Need 
ection VI of the Introduction to the Critique of Judgment 
is titled: "On the connection of the feeling of pleasure 
with the concept of the purposiveness of nature".24 There 
Kant declares that “the discovery of the order of nature is an 
occupation of the understanding conducted with regard to a 
necessary purpose of its own; that is, the unification of this 
order under principles."25 As we know, the mental state at the 
basis of a judgment of beauty cannot be the result of my having 
attained a personal purpose, for such a pleasure would be mere 
agreeableness. Instead, the purpose that is fulfilled in the 
discovery of order in nature must be the natural purpose of 
reflective judgment itself. 
Indeed, Kant justifies the a priori principle upon which 
judgment must be presupposed to function – that the manifold 
of apparently contingent “elements” must be presumed to 
                                                
22 KU, 5:180. 
23 KU, 5:180. Kant writes: "For where we think purposes as bases that make certain things 
possible, we must also assume means whose causal law does not itself require anything that 
presupposes a purpose, so that this law can be mechanical and yet also a subordinate cause of 
intentional effects." Cf., also KU, 5:414 
24 KU, 5:186. 
25 KU, 5:187. 
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always already be unified (as if by God) – on the basis of the 
argument that this is required if the understanding is to be able 
to complete its “assigned task” of rendering nature compre-
hensible.26 Here Kant applies his “technic of judgment” to the 
analysis of reflective judgment. Kant, in other words, takes the 
a priori principle of purposiveness to be the overarching organ-
izational principle of the total system of empirical concepts [i.e., 
of aesthetic reflective judgment] and declares that it is for the 
sake of the fulfilment of the promise of this principle [i.e., for 
the discovery of order in nature] that system appears to exist. 
Since we cannot, for any given investigation, know that a 
given hypothesized concept – say that of phlogiston – is an 
actual member of the system, all the unknown particular 
empirical concepts that comprise the total system are "contin-
gent as far as we can see (i.e., we cannot cognize them a 
priori)".27 At the same time, the possibility of discovering any 
one of these concepts requires that no empirical concept is, in 
fact, contingent because any unknown empirical concept 
depends for the possibility of its discovery upon the constraints 
generated by the interaction of all the empirical concepts that 
comprise the system.28 As a result, we must conceive any given 
part of the system that remains undiscovered to be, like apples 
on a very young apple tree, both necessary and contingent, as 
far as we can see.29 We must, once again, consider nature to be 
organized in this way (i.e., as a self-organizing entity or “natural 
purpose”) because such is required if we are to secure the 
                                                
26 Cf., also where Kant writes: “Now, nature’s causality regarding the form that its products 
have as purposes I would call a technic of nature” (FI, 20:219). The deduction is circular. It 
hinges on an application of the technic of teleological judgment which Kant sets out in the 
Critique of Teleological Judgment and which dictates that the principle of mechanism be 
subordinated to the principle of teleology in investigating nature; i.e., that we consider nature 
as if it were designed. 
27 KU, 5:183. 
28 KU, 5:369-372. 
29 This argument applies not only to undiscovered empirical concepts, but also to all 
empirical concepts, since they all must be generated on-demand for each moment of 
experience. 
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possibility of progress in unifying it and so be able to satisfy our 
need to understand nature. We cannot, however, ever know that 
nature is unified in this way because the very the idea of an 
entity with the kind of structure that is being attributed to 
reflective judgment contains a contradiction. The concept of a 
natural purpose "is only a maxim of reflective rather than of 
determinative judgment; and hence it holds only subject-
ively".30 Thus, Kant's attribution of purposes to nature and to 
reflective judgment can amount to no more than an unavoidable 
strategy of investigation – a technic of judgment, as he calls it. 
Reflective judgment must be conceived as depending upon a 
self-organizing system of empirical concepts governed in accor-
dance with an a priori principle because, given its isolation 
from both the manifold of intuition and pure concepts of the 
understanding, such is required, if it is to be possible for it to 
form and apply concepts correctly in fulfillment of its’ (as if) 
assigned purpose of unifying nature under principles.31 But we 
cannot know that the understanding actually has a purpose of its 
own and so we cannot know that the system upon which reflec-
tive judgment depends is governed by an a priori principle. 
Thus, we cannot know cannot know that nature will be render-
ed comprehensible to us. 
Kant maintains this state of affairs provides a background of 
insecurity against which our visceral need to understand nature 
must be considered. We are as if by design burdened with a 
state of discomfort, the possibility of relief of which is entirely 
uncertain. Thus, Kant writes: “This is why we rejoice (actually 
we are relieved of a need) when, just as if it were a lucky 
                                                
30 KU, 5:413. See also §74 titled, "The reason why it is impossible to treat the concept of a 
technic of nature dogmatically is that a natural purpose is inexplicable" (KU, 5:395-7). 
31 Kant attributes this same need to reason when he writes: "And yet reason requires that 
even the particular laws of nature be combined in a unified and hence lawful way. (This 
lawfulness of the contingent is called purposiveness). Therefore, unless the power of 
judgment has [its own] universal law under which it can subsume that particular, it cannot 
recognize any purposiveness in it and hence cannot make any determinative judgments" 
(KU, 5:404). 
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chance favoring our aim, we do find such systematic unity 
among merely empirical laws, even though we necessarily had 
to assume that there is such a unity even though we have no 
insight into this unity and cannot prove it.”32 The light of reason 
reveals to us no guarantee that nature is unified in the way that 
we require. Hence, whenever we are successful in our en-
deavour of unifying nature under principles we experience 
pleasure in light of the apparent contingency of that success.33 
We are temporarily relieved of our need. Moreover, argues 
Kant, since the possibility of this success requires the a priori 
principle of purposiveness as a condition, there is, in such 
situations, “a basis that determines the feeling of pleasure a 
priori and validly for everyone.”34 
Here, however, Kant goes beyond what he can legitimately 
conclude. The consistency of his theory of aesthetic reflective 
judgment depends upon it being impossible for us to know 
categorically (i.e., determinatively) that reflective judgment 
operates in accordance with an a priori principle. If it could be 
determined that reflective judgment is governed by the a priori 
principle of purposiveness then the unification of nature under 
principles would be known to occur necessarily. In that case, 
although considerable effort might be required to unify nature, 
we could not conceive ourselves to be making discoveries, 
since we would know that the answer would show up event-
ually. Sorting out a puzzle in natural science would, thus, rather 
be like knowing for certain that the missing keys were in the 
car, but not quite knowing where in the car. You would have no 
fear that they were missing, but you might have to take the car 
apart to find them. Hence, if the a priori principle of pur-
posiveness could be known to govern reflective judgment then 
                                                
32 KU, 5:183 
33 Hence, Kant writes that "in thinking of nature as harmonizing, in the diversity of its 
particular laws, with our need to find universal principles [Allgemeinheit der Prinzipien] for 
them, we must, as far as our insight goes, judge this harmony as contingent, yet also 
indispensable for the needs of our understanding" (KU, 5:187). 
34 KU, 5:187. 
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we could not be thought to be investigating nature against the 
background of an insecurity regarding the possibility of its 
unification under principles; and so we could not be thought to 
be surprised and relieved when some order appeared to us. 
Thus, there would, under such circumstances, be no particular 
reason to "rejoice" – although we would undoubtedly feel 
pleasure at having completed the task (an interested pleasure). 
Knowledge of an a priori principle of purposiveness that 
governs reflective judgment would sever the connection that 
Kant forges between it, the contingent satisfaction of an aim, 
and the production of that (disinterested) pleasure which Kant 
requires for his theory of aesthetic reflective judgment. 
Consequently, if Kant’s theory is to remain consistent then the 
experience of discovery and the pleasure that accompanies it, 
can only be empirical evidence in favour of the idea, which we 
adopt unavoidably, that an a priori principle governs reflective 
judgment (i.e., and by implication that nature is a natural 
purpose).35 The discovery of a new law of nature, along with 
the pleasure that accompanies that discovery, can provide no 
objective ground for concluding that there is a total system of 
empirical concepts governed in accordance with an a priori 
principle. Moreover, as I noted above, such knowledge would 
be tantamount to declaring the system upon which reflective 
judgment depends to be a natural purpose, which would require 
applying a problematic concept determinatively. 
A closely related line of thought leads Paul Guyer to 
conclude that Kant's theory of reflective judgment is, in fact, 
internally inconsistent. Guyer argues that since the a priori 
principle of purposiveness is apparently designed to guarantee 
that we will be successful in perceiving meaningful order in 
nature, and since such perceptions always further the necessary 
purpose (or aim) of cognition, this principle is inconsistent with 
                                                
35 KU, 5:186-188. 
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the only way in which it can be linked to pleasure, i.e., in the 
contingent satisfaction of an aim.36 Guyer writes: 
 
The present argument connects pleasure to the perception 
of systematicity in virtue of the contingency of such 
perception, or the fact that systematicity is not guaranteed 
by the laws of the understanding [i.e., by the pure 
concepts]; but the principle of reflective judgment, that 
nature itself is systematic was apparently designed to 
guarantee that such a perception would occur, or would at 
least not seem to be contingent.37 
 
The problem with Guyer’s analysis is that it fails to take into 
account the fact that Kant's attribution of purpose to nature, and 
by implication to the understanding, can be no more than 
heuristic. 
 As we have argued, the a priori principle of purposiveness is 
judged to govern reflective judgment in accordance with an 
application of the a priori principle of teleological judgment 
(i.e., of the concept of a natural purpose - a technic of 
judgment). The claim that we cannot help but judge nature to be 
systematic is not equivalent to the claim that nature is 
systematic. Since the expectation of systematicity in nature is 
merely a product of an unavoidable way of judging nature, the 
contingency that Kant’s theory requires is not threatened. 
Consequently, Kant's theory of aesthetic judgment is saved 
from the particular inconsistency attributed to it by Guyer, but at 
the cost of making it impossible to establish determinately that 
reflective judgment functions on the basis of an a priori 
principle. 
Of course, if it cannot be known that reflective judgment 
operates on the basis of an a priori principle, neither can it be 
established determinatively that the pleasure resulting from its 
                                                
36 Guyer, P.: Kant and the Claims of Taste. Cambridge. 1997, 69-74. 
37 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 74 (emphasis mine, brackets mine). 
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supposed activity is universally valid. The most that we can 
conclude is that since we cannot help but judge reflective 
judgment to be governed by an a priori principle, we cannot 
help but judge the pleasure in question to be universally valid. 
Consequently, we cannot help but judge certain things to be 
beautiful. The demand that others see them as beautiful is the 
product of similar logic. 
While it is true that the a priori principle of purposiveness is 
designed to guarantee that nature will be intelligible, it does so 
only on the presupposition that the understanding has a 
necessary purpose of its own which reflective judgment serves. 
The need of the understanding to unify nature under principles 
can only be met if empirical concepts form a self-organizing 
system governed in accordance with an a priori principle. 
However, even if we accept as true the idea that we have a need 
to unify nature under principles, in order to go from this 
phenomenological “fact of judgment” to the conclusion that the 
understanding has a purpose of its own requires that we judge 
nature purposively, which, even if such a judgment is unavoid-
able, can only be done reflectively. Consequently, it is imposs-
ible to know categorically that reflective judgment is governed 
in accordance with an a priori principle; i.e., that the total 
system of empirical concepts is a natural purpose which spon-
taneously forms and applies empirical concepts correctly. 
 
The Role of the Power of Desire 
in the Problem of the Key 
 
he approach that I have taken to analyzing Kant’s theory 
of reflective judgment, which puts his technic of judg-
ment at the centre, has the capacity to offer a novel way 
of resolving the problem of the key. In the section of the 
Critique of Judgment titled “On Purposiveness in General” 
Kant argues that a purpose, taken by itself, “is the object of a 
concept insofar as we regard this concept as the object’s cause 
T 
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(the real possibility); and the causality that the concept has with 
regard to its object is purposiveness (forma finalis).”38 Thus, if I 
have as my purpose to build a house then the possibility of this 
house being realized – the house considered as an effect – 
depends on my concept of it considered as a cause; that is, it 
depends on the purposiveness of that concept.39 Such a causal 
structure immediately implies the involvement of the will, as 
the power of desire (Begehrungsvermögen). As Kant points out 
in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, it is an 
analytic proposition that in my willing of an object as an effect 
there is already conceived the causality of myself as an acting 
cause.40 Hence, Kant writes that in a judgment of beauty “the 
feeling of pleasure is determined a priori and validly for 
everyone merely because we refer the object to the cognitive 
power; [for] in this case the concept of purposiveness does not 
in the least concern the power of desire [i.e., the will insofar as it 
has purpose].”41 The central import of this claim is that 
aesthetically produced pleasure is not the result of furthering 
any particular purpose of my own. It is rather the result of the 
cognitive system furthering its’ (as if) assigned purpose of 
unifying nature under principles.42 Since the purposiveness, 
which is bound up with a judgment of beauty, does not involve 
the power of desire, it follows that it does not involve the 
empirical subject.43 It is, therefore, strictly speaking, not a 
                                                
38 KU, 5:220. 
39 At KU, 5:172, for example, Kant writes: “For the will, as the power of desire, is one of the 
many natural causes in the world, namely, the one that acts in accordance with concepts;” i.e., 
in conformity with the presentation of a purpose (p. 10). Cf. also KU, 5:220. 
40 GMS, 4:417. Cf. also KrV, B 275-6, KU, 5:172, KU, 5:204, KU, 5:206, KrV, A 539/B 
567, and MS, 6:213. 
41 KU, 5:187 Cf. also in the First Moment Kant claims: “Interest is what we call the liking we 
connect with the presentation of an object’s existence. Hence such a liking always refers at 
once to our power of desire, either as a basis that determines it, or at any rate as necessarily 
connected with that determining basis” (KU, 5:204). 
42 KU, 5:186-187.   
43 On the issue of aesthetic displeasure I follow Hannah Ginsborg's analysis. A judgment of 
aesthetic displeasure is the result of frustrated expectations, but these expectations may be 
based on previous experiences of beauty. Ginsborg writes: “Things strike us as ugly, I want 
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judgment that I make. The judgment, as Kant says, is not a 
cognitive one.44 
It stands to reason then that the judgment that some object 
furthers the general aim of cognition is made by reflective 
judgment itself in its capacity to be self-legislative and the 
purposiveness of the manifold in the fulfillment of this aim is 
not something that breaks through into awareness. The cogni-
tive faculties are able to respond to it, but it is not cognizable. 
As Kant argues a little later, “the subjective [feature] of the 
(re)presentation which cannot at all become an element of 
cognition is the purposiveness that precedes the cognition of an 
object…”45 The only detectable “sensation” directly connected 
with reflective judgment simpliciter is, therefore, the feeling of 
pleasure, which Kant claims is universally valid precisely 
because it was not contaminated by subjective particularities.46 
This line of argument raises the question of how we are able 
to distinguish beautiful objects from those that are merely 
agreeable or good when we have only pleasure to rely upon. 
Kant’s response to this question is that a person “can only attain 
certainty on this point, by merely being conscious that he is 
separating whatever belongs to the agreeable and the good from 
the liking that remains to him after that. It is only for [or by 
means of] this that he counts on everyone’s assent, and he 
would under these conditions [always] be justified in his claim 
[that x is beautiful], if only he did not on occasion fail to 
                                                                                                           
to suggest, only because they fail to strike us as beautiful in situations where we take a certain 
degree of beauty to be called for...” Hannah Ginsborg, Aesthetic Judging and the 
Intentionality of Pleasure, Inquiry, 46 (2003): 177-178.  
44 FI, 20:221. 
45 KU, 5:189. 
46 The term “sensation” appears in quotes here in recognition of the force of Zuckert’s 
argument against Guyer that pleasure is not a sensation and that Kant has consequently 
changed his mind about pleasure being singular in the Critique of Judgment (op. cit., p. 236-
241). Be that as it may, an appeal to intentional pleasure does not, of course, by itself avoid 
the problem raised in the introduction (see Zuckert, p. 247). 
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observe these conditions and so make an erroneous judgment of 
taste”.47 
Kant’s language here seems to imply that in order to 
determine whether an object is beautiful one must be involved 
in actively discriminating, perhaps after the fact, whether a 
given pleasure has been produced simply by having furthered a 
necessary aim of cognition. As I noted earlier, it is not un-
common for commentators responding to this and related 
passages to argue that Kant’s theory of reflective judgment 
requires a second order judgment in order to discriminate 
between pleasures (or between sources of the production of 
pleasure).48 There is, however, even if pleasures are not 
phenomenologically distinguishable, another possible indicator 
that the source of this pleasure is different and, consequently, 
there is another way to account for the possibility of error in 
judgments of taste. 
On Kant’s theory of judgment, the possibility of simul-
taneously experiencing pleasure resulting both from an interest 
in an object (whether in something merely agreeable or in 
something good) and from a harmonization of the cognitive 
faculties is precluded, for this would require the simultaneous 
engagement and disengagement of the power of desire. This is 
clearly not possible with respect to the same (re)presentations at 
the same time. One must, therefore, leave one state in order for 
the other to manifest and since, for Kant, pleasurable states tend 
                                                
47 KU, 5:216. 
48 Paul Guyer, who may be credited with focussing this debate, argues that for Kant to be 
consistent the perception of the experience of the underlying pleasure requires the exercise of 
a psychological capacity over and above what is necessary in cases of mere cognition. 
Moreover, Guyer writes that: “Once a capacity which is not an absolutely necessary 
condition of knowledge is introduced into the explanation of aesthetic response, so is an 
element of contingency, and the possibility of an entirely justifiable a priori imputation of 
aesthetic response to others is precluded. ... The psychological capacity to experience the free 
harmony of imagination and understanding goes beyond the minimal capacity for 
knowledge, and ... this harmony occasions a pleasure which is not felt in every case of 
knowledge” (Guyer, 1979, p. 323; 1997, p. 287). 
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to persist of their own accord, they will naturally resist change 
to another state.49 
It follows that as long as an individual remains moderately 
successful in the pursuit of his merely personal purposes, that 
individual is unlikely to experience beauty, since he remains 
preoccupied with pleasures in the agreeable and the good. Thus, 
he needs an uncomfortable (displeasurable) predisposition as 
part of his “judging nature” which cannot be satisfied in this 
usual manner, but which requires for its satisfaction a temporary 
suspension of the influence of the power of desire on (re)pre-
sentations.50 Indeed, it is probable that awareness of this need is 
dependent, in the first place, upon its sudden satisfaction in a 
moment of aesthetic appreciation. This dramatic change in the 
state of the subject is not likely to go without notice and can, 
therefore, serve as a reliable indicator that the pleasure which 
results in its wake (from a harmonization of the cognitive 
faculties) was not his doing. 
Once aesthetically produced pleasure occurs, “separating 
out” this pleasure, from pleasure in an object (which cannot 
actually be present) requires, therefore, attention to the state of 
the subject; in particular, to the absence of his normal pur-
poseful mode of being, which is a kind of relief.51 Such an 
                                                
49 Kant is very interested in what we would now call first order phase transitions in which 
there is a discontinuous jump in the state of the system (see, for example, KU, 5:348).  
50 Kant writes: “So, if we are to feel pleasure in [response to] the harmony, which we regard 
as merely contingent, of nature’s heterogenous laws with our cognitive power, we need 
something that in our judging of nature makes us pay attention to this purposiveness of nature 
for our understanding – namely, an endeavour to bring, if possible, these heterogenous laws 
under higher though still empirical laws, when this endeavour is met with success” (KU 
5:188). 
51 Barchana-Lorand argues that “the feeling of pleasure … is always present in the operation 
of reflective judgment.” But, “that we do not remain at the purely formal and pleasurable 
level of reflective judgment, and our attention from this pleasure is distracted by interests in 
concepts linked with the object in the second level of reflective judgment, does not entail that 
we do not, on our way to the second level of reflection, pass through this first pleasurable 
level” (op. cit., 2002, p. 321). Such language is misleading. First, it implies the existence of a 
pleasure (a feeling) that one does not notice (i.e., feel) because one is not attending to it. 
Second, it does not sufficiently emphasize the masking of pleasure;  the curtailing of the 
process caused by the engagement of the power of desire. Consequently, she requires a 
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explanation renders intelligible such phrases as “stunning 
beauty.” Beautiful objects, it seems, share with intellectual 
discoveries the capacity to temporarily suspend the reference of 
(re)presentations to the power of desire and so to momentarily 
relieve us of ourselves. 
Awareness of this relief underpins claims for the universal 
validity of such experiences. The universal validity of the 
resulting pleasure is guaranteed not by what is present in it, but 
rather by what is absent from it, and, only because of this, by 
what is present in it; that is, the sudden absence of a kind of 
striving for order which is unavoidably connected with being a 
willing subject, unveils an underlying pleasurable state that is 
symbolic of the morally good. It is not necessary, therefore, to 
posit special properties of aesthetically produced pleasure, qua 
pleasure, in order to account for this sense of universal validity 
in a judgment of beauty. 
At the same time, it is not inconceivable that one might 
mistakenly judge an interested pleasure to be an indication of a 
beautiful object. A person may expect to find beauty in an 
object and then “read” a consequent pleasure as confirmation of 
that anticipated beauty, when in fact it is mere gratification.52 
So, for example, one might play a favourite recording with the 
anticipation of an experience of beauty and then mistakenly 
attribute the gratification obtained from being able to play that 
recording with pleasure “in” the object, i.e., beauty. The mis-
take in this case results from inattentiveness to one’s own state. 
When we correctly attribute the pleasure we experience in an 
aesthetic judgment to the object, we are aware that there is a 
                                                                                                           
“second level of teleological judgment” that leads to the formation of a concept. The 
involvement of the power of desire does not, however, imply a second order judgment. 
Rather the power of desire restricts and usurps the process of reflective judgment in service of 
the attainment of personal ends, which always requires the formation of a concept, with the 
result that the pleasure, if it gets started at all, must immediately be masked by “mere 
cognition”, which always involves the empirical subject. 
52 KU, 290  n15. 
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sense in which this pleasure had nothing to do with me.53 The 
feeling of pleasure that I experience in apparent response to the 
object comes upon me in a manner akin to that in which 
sensible impressions do; even against my will. It is as if the 
pleasure were a predicate of the object.54 It is this feature of 
aesthetic judgment, therefore, that accounts for “the universal 
communicability of the mental state,” for the fact that one quite 
naturally conceives that others will also declare such objects to 
be beautiful (although why they ought to do so is not yet fully 
clear), and for the necessary postulation (or presupposition) of a 
“common sense” that lies at the basis of such judgments, even 
if, as I have been arguing, the feeling of pleasure alone can give 
us no indication of such a sense.55 
Further support for the present understanding of reflective 
judgment is to be found in Rachel Zuckert’s insightful book, 
Beauty and Biology. Zuckert draws our attention to the fact that 
in Kant’s Anthropology pleasure taken in objects with which 
we have no prior experience – initial pleasures – must be inter-
preted as relief from pain. About such objects Kant writes: 
 
Although leaving one point in time and entering another is 
one and the same act (of change), there is still a temporal 
sequence in our thought and in the consciousness of this 
change, in conformity with the relation of cause and 
effect. – So the question arises, whether it is the con-
sciousness of leaving our present state or the prospect of 
entering a future state that awakens in us the sensation of 
                                                
53 Although I suspect that Rachel Zuckert will not follow me to such a conclusion, she 
affirms that, for Kant, aesthetic “pleasure does not provide cognition even of the subject; 
because pleasure is not a conceptual representation (much less a judgment), but merely a 
‘felt’ attitude, it may not itself ‘provide cognition’ of the subject” (op. cit., 2007, p. 270). She 
furthermore suggests that while pleasures that are connected with human purposes can be 
objectively judged to “belong” to the empirical subject, aesthetic pleasure cannot (pp. 272-3).  
54 KU, 5:191. 
55 Without such a presupposition we would fall into skepticism. “Common sense,” in this 
case, writes Kant, “is a mere ideal standard” (KU, 5:239). Moreover, the a priori principle of 
purposiveness is simply “regarded as a common sense” (KU, 5:238) – emphasis altered. 
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enjoyment? In the first case the enjoyment  is simply 
removal from pain – something negative; in the second it 
would be presentiment of something agreeable, and so an 
increase of the state of pleasure – something positive. But 
we can already guess beforehand that only the first will 
happen; for time drags us from the present to the future 
(not vice versa), and the cause of our agreeable feeling can 
be only that we are compelled to leave the present, though 
it is not specified into what other state we shall enter – 
except that it is another one.56 
 
Since this quote occurs in a discussion of pleasure in the 
agreeable Zuckert restricts its applicability to such pleasure. 
“Aesthetic pleasure”, she concludes, “does not seem to pre-
suppose something that precedes it – there is no concept that 
determines what we are “looking for” in the object, nor can we 
identify a pain that is alleviated by the (unexpected) encounter 
with the beautiful object.”57 As we have been arguing, however, 
the experience of aesthetically produced pleasure must be 
understood to take place against the background of a need to 
understand nature combined with insecurity regarding our 
capacity to do so. It is this uncomfortable predisposition that is 
relieved in a moment of aesthetic experience. It is this relief that 
draws our attention to that pleasure which accompanies a 
harmonization of the cognitive faculties. We probably ought 
also to add here that since this state is particularly sweet for us it 
becomes infused with a longing for its continuance. 
Kant is arguing that under normal circumstances cognition is 
intimately connected with preferences; for in order to know 
how one should deal with some part of the world one first needs 
to know to what extent and in what respects it is agreeable or 
disagreeable and this requires knowing what it is. The power of 
reflective judgment to generate empirical concepts is, conse-
                                                
56 Immanuel Kant, Anthropology, 7:231, in Zuckert, 2007, op. cit., pp. 272-273. 
57 Ibid., p. 276. 
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quently, normally pressed into the service of personal purposes. 
The pleasure or displeasure that I commonly experience as 
connected with objects, therefore, generally results from how 
these objects are expected to affect me and do affect me.58 If 
there is a pleasure of reflective judgment proper that precedes 
empirical concept formation/application then it is very short-
lived indeed and masked by the reference of (re)presentations to 
the power of desire which calls on the faculty of understanding 
to bend the fabric of the faculty of imagination to serve merely 
personal ends.59 In a judgment of taste, however, the power of 
desire is not involved and we are consequently not “compelled 
to give our approval [or disapproval] by any interest, whether of 
sense or of reason”.60 Only judgments of this type are free from 
the compulsions that must be presupposed in cases where 
interest is the basis that determines approval or disapproval. 
 
Unlocking the Mystery of the Key 
 
t is possible to provide a more detailed description of this 
process that is keeping with the spirit of Kant’s philo-
sophical approach to analyzing judgment.  To begin, con-
sider the paragraph that immediately follows Kant’s definition 
of a purpose. For it is no coincidence that the section immed-
iately prior to this one contains the problem of key to the 
critique of taste. He writes: 
 
The power of desire, insofar as it can be determined to act 
only by concepts, i.e., in conformity with the presentation 
                                                
58 KU, 5:209. 
59 Hence, Kant holds that; “if a judgment about beauty is mingled with the least interest then 
it is very partial and not a pure judgment of taste” (KU, 5:205). I take Kant to be arguing that 
such judgments are simply mistaken; that is, they are not judgments of taste at all. Hence, he 
continues: “In order to play the judge in matters of taste, we must not be in the least in favor 
of a thing’s existence but must be wholly indifferent about it” (KU, 5:205). 
60 KU, 5:210  – emphasis mine. 
I 
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of a purpose would be the will. On the other hand, we do 
call, objects, states of mind, or acts purposive even if their 
possibility does not necessarily presuppose the present-
ation of a purpose; we do this merely because we can 
explain and grasp them only if we assume that they are 
based on a causality [that operates] according to purposes, 
i.e., on a will that would have so arranged them in 
accordance with the presentation of a certain rule. Hence 
there can be purposiveness without a purpose, insofar as 
we do not posit the causes of this form in a will, and yet 
can grasp the explanation of its possibility only by 
deriving it from a will. Now what we observe we do not 
always need to have insight into by reason (as to how it is 
possible). Hence we can at least observe a purposiveness 
as to form and take note of it in objects – even if only by 
reflection – without [actually] basing it on a purpose (as 
matter of a nexus finalis).61 
 
This passage, which reads like a preamble to the Critique of 
Teleological Judgment, is intended to begin to address the 
question of how reflective judgment can be self-governing. 
Purposiveness without a purpose is a description of the caus-
ality by means of which reflective judgment is thought to 
operate. According to Kant, all kinds of things – objects, states 
of mind, and acts – can legitimately be considered to be 
purposive without a purpose even if, on the one hand, their 
possibility does not, in fact, presuppose that such things were 
actually designed in accordance with a will (i.e., God’s will) 
and, on the other hand, reason has no other insight into how 
these things are possible. 
In the First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment Kant 
declares that “all purposiveness of nature can be regarded either 
as natural (forma finalis naturae spontanea) or as intentional 
                                                
61 KU, 5:220. 
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(forma finalis naturae intentionalis).”62 Since he has ruled out 
the latter as that purposiveness by means of which reflective 
judgment functions, we are left with the former. As I have 
argued, proceeding to consider the aesthetic reflective judgment 
in this way allows Kant to lift out of his observations, a 
principle, by means of which reflective judgment can be 
conceived to govern its own operations. This is the a priori 
principle of purposiveness. This principle is a formal descrip-
tion of the normativity that can simultaneously be conceived as 
arising from the reciprocal means-ends relations that exist 
between the elements of which the faculty of imagination, at 
any given moment, is comprised.63 In this case, the required 
normativity is, once again, supplied by the system itself.  
It is possible to provide a plausible Kantian-inspired account 
of the functioning of the underlying systems involved in reflec-
tive judgment as they either experience an object as beautiful or 
form and apply concepts that permit the object to be cognized. 
At any given moment we can conceive the faculty of imagi-
nation to function either independently or under the influence of 
the power of desire. On the one hand, if the power of desire 
leads the way with an interest, then the system of empirical 
concepts alters the self-organizing dynamics of the faculty of 
                                                
62 FI, 20:235. 
63 In this case, all the diverse “parts” of which the manifold is comprised, through their own 
causality, in some way, produce one another as regards both their form and combination, and 
in this way produce a whole whose concept can, conversely, be judged to be the cause of the 
very process of unification, so that the connection of efficient causes can at the same time be 
judged to be a causation through final causes. In this case, everything can be considered both 
as end and also a means. A centerpiece of Zuckert’s book is her defense of an identity of 
means-ends relations with purposiveness without a purpose. For further support of this claim 
I defer to her arguments; see, in particular, (op. cit., 2007, pp. 123-124, p. 193, pp. 224-230). 
The central difference between the position being advocated here and the one set out by 
Zuckert can be traced to the fact that, for a variety of reasons, Zuckert believes aesthetic 
reflective judgment to be an activity of the subject, i.e., aesthetic reflective judging. On the 
argument advanced herein, since any activity of the subject would invoke the power of 
desire, and aesthetic reflective judgment does not do so, aesthetic reflective judging is not 
something that I do. 
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imagination so as to produce a concept.64 In the case of the 
famous duck-rabbit phenomenon, for instance, whether individ-
uals first see a duck or rabbit is influenced by priming effects, 
such as whether the viewing takes place in spring (near Easter) 
or the fall (near duck-hunting season). Since this activity 
furthers the attainment of a desired purpose, it is generally grati-
fying. On the other hand, if there is no interest, even for a 
moment, then the self-organizing dynamics of the faculty of 
imagination are free of such influence.65 Here, according to 
Kant, the temporarily isolated systems that correspond to the 
faculty of imagination and the faculty of understanding enter a 
larger metastable state of some kind that, in preserving itself, is 
pleasurable.66 
In the case of a suspension of the influence of the power of 
desire, the system that is responsible for reflective judgment 
does not find itself subject to a heteronomy of empirical in-
fluences from the faculty of understanding. Instead, “concern-
ing objects of such a pure liking” this system “legislates to 
itself, just as reason does regarding the power of desire.”67 It is 
for this reason that beauty can be symbolic (an indirect 
exhibition) of the morally good. For in both cases the 
autonomous functioning of these systems depends on an 
absence of interest; that is, on the absence of external causal 
influences resulting from the adoption of particular purposes by 
a willing subject.68 Consequently, the capacity of the beautiful 
to be symbolic of the morally good is intimately bound up with 
                                                
64 This anticipated object either is pleasure (or avoidance of pain) or is an object empirically 
connected with pleasure (MM, 4:399 in ibid., p. 246). Cf. also ibid., p. 261.  
65 See, for example, KU, 217, KU, 295-296, and KU, 316-17. Hence, there is some truth to 
the view of Longuenesse that “aesthetic judgment starts where the search for concepts 
collapses” (Longuenesse, 2003, op. cit., p. 146).  
66 Staring off into space or at firelight, seemingly thinking of nothing, does not usually result 
in an experience of beauty because the purposive mode of being is still operative, though 
unfocussed. I may not currently have any specific expectations, but have not left my 
purposive mode of being (cf. Zuckert, 2007, op. cit., p. 275-76). 
67 KU, 5:353. 
68 See Zuckert, 2007, op. cit. pp. 248-253 for a nice analysis of “interest.” 
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the fact that, in both types of judgment, the lower power of 
desire is not leading the way. This absence of influence permits 
the systems involved to govern themselves in what we can 
legitimately conceive as an “attempt” of those systems to attain 
purposes inherent in them.69 From this analogical vantage point, 
pleasure results because the system is able to attain an aim that 
is both necessary and contingent, as far as we can see. Since this 
pleasure has no connection with any interest, but inheres in the 
autonomous (or he-autonomous) functioning of the underlying 
system of faculties, we naturally take it must be shared by all 
humans. The indicator of the universal validity of this mental 
state is the sudden relief that we experience when the presence 
of the object precipitates a temporary shutdown of the influence 
of the power of desire on systems that are ultimately responsible 
for concept formation and application. 
 
Conclusion 
 
o be consistent Kant cannot permit a judgment of taste 
to depend upon any special intentional content by 
means of which it might be identified. The universal 
communicability of the mental state must be apparent only to 
reflective judgment itself. The whole process of judgment must 
occur entirely a priori. This may be explanatorily unsatisfying, 
but it is the only way that the pleasure in question could be 
universally valid. The key to understanding the universal com-
municability of the mental state is realizing that when (re)pre-
sentations do not concern the power of desire we are moment-
arily relieved of an inescapable need that is bound up with our 
sense of ourselves as rational beings in need of systematic 
                                                
69 The main difference between these two forms of autonomy is that Kant acknowledges that 
our liking for the morally good is necessarily connected with an interest, “but with an interest 
that does not precede our judgment about the liking but is produced by this judgment in the 
first place” ( KU, 5:354). 
T 
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order. It is this relief that accounts for the certainty that one is 
“separating out” the beautiful from the agreeable and the good. 
Kant's employment of the principle of teleological judgment 
as a solution to the problem of judgment is consistent with his 
arguments in the Critique of Judgment concerning the general-
ity with which this principle must be applied. As Kant observes, 
once we have determined that a certain body must be judged to 
be a natural purpose, "everything in such a body must be re-
garded as [similarly] organized".70 Since a human being clearly 
meets the definition of a natural purpose, it follows that all of its 
parts are similarly natural purposes. Thus, it would seem that to 
be consistent Kant must judge the faculties of understanding, 
reason and judgment to be natural purposes. 
Whether he is concerned with a manifold of intuitions, a 
manifold of purposes, or a manifold of concepts, the idea of a 
self-organizing entity provides him with a way to have a divers-
ity of parts lawfully united in order to realize an a priori func-
tion. This teleological approach to thinking about the powers of 
the soul provides Kant with the possibility of systemic self-
governance while simultaneously avoiding the demand to 
provide an explanation of that self-governance. Instead of an 
explanation of autonomous control Kant provides only an 
examination (or exposition) of it.71 Such an examination is, 
however, all that he requires, for his goal is only to establish the 
possibility of reconciliation between the mechanistic and 
teleological modes of explanation by rendering both of them to 
be dependent upon our particularly human kind of understand-
ing, which, he observes, must always proceed from the parts to 
the whole. This discursive type of understanding, he argues, 
must be contrasted with another kind of understanding, which is 
intuitive and which is able to proceed determinatively from the 
whole to the parts.72 In this way, Kant defends the possibility 
                                                
70 KU, 5:377. 
71 KU, 5:412. 
72 KU, 5:405-410. 
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that the contradictory causal picture inherent in our appre-
hension of self-organizing systems is a function of our limited 
kind of understanding. 
